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ABSTRACT
This review postulates that today’s digital environments unveil an era of connectivity, in which digital com-
munication devices exercise a general influence on social interactions and public deliberation. From this 
perspective, it argues that connective practices are likely to affect two main components of the normative 
public sphere, namely rational criticism and ideological sustainability. Drawing on the case of the 2011 Arab 
revolutions, in which social media proved to have a strategic function, this paper illustrates the ideological 
heterogeneity of social networks. Additionally, this article considers how issues of rational criticism and 
ideological sustainability could be improved by regulating online interactions and proposes that the digital 
divide could act as a natural process of regulation for today’s connective and transnational public sphere.
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INTRODUCTION
With an eye to anticipating the effect of digital 
technologies on representative democracy, 
research in the fields of politics, development 
and public administration is examining how 
public infrastructures can be adapted to meet 
the needs of a participatory and collaborative 
culture. Indeed, the connective and collaborative 
patterns generated by the use of social media and 
interactive communication devices has signifi-
cantly increased the power of individuals within 
their social environment. As such, it is likely 
to revolutionise the structure of representative 
democracies. Therefore, experts in the field of 
political sciences aim to anticipate the future 
evolution of public administrations by defining 
online interactions between citizens and their 
governments.
They explore all forms of online infra-
structure that contribute to the establishment 
of an e-democracy, such as e-governance or 
local e-participation projects. By doing so, they 
intend to identify structural differences between 
online deliberation and traditional forms of 
representative democracy. Simultaneously, 
development studies underline the potential 
benefits of digital technologies in developing 
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countries and evaluate new ways of providing 
free access to information in regions facing a 
high level of digital divide. Alternative academic 
work in the field focuses on how to implement 
successful e-governance in democratising 
countries, which reduces the costs of public 
administration as well as the level of corrup-
tion, by providing direct communication flows 
between a government and its people.
Yet this research does not take into account 
the existing patterns of online deliberation that 
have already taken shape among the community 
of internet and social media users. Indeed, it 
is now necessary to understand the effect of 
digital and connective culture on representative 
democracy from a broader perspective. This 
requires investigating the internal structure of 
connective societies and identifying the factors 
that contribute to the elaboration of a rational 
and critical public opinion in the digital world. In 
this regard, social theorists have been discussing 
the sociological transformations that came with 
the emergence of connective and transnational 
networks. Opposing views have been expressed 
regarding the effect of such networks on neolib-
eral societies. Whereas some experts argue that 
transnational communication flows preserve the 
freedom of expression inherent to democracy, 
others claim that connective practices are deter-
mined by the commercial interest of web corpo-
rations and fail at promoting an impartial public 
opinion. To some extent, both views confirm 
Habermas’ theory of the public sphere, as they 
illustrate the process through which informa-
tion can be liberalised, whether it is politically 
or economically. In order to contribute and 
build a macro theory about future participative 
democracies, this article reviews some of the 
studies that analyse online social interactions 
from a Habermassian perspective and identifies 
two major differences between cyberspace and 
the normative public sphere: rational criticism 
and ideological sustainability. Referring to the 
theories of Cardon (2010), Flichy (2010), and 
Dean (2003) this paper demonstrates how in-
ternet usage contrasts with the original project 
of the web pioneers who envisioned virtual 
space as an alternative to neoliberal society. It 
presents the argument that the mass of internet 
users failed in defending the libertarian values 
that inspired the web and did not manage to 
produce a sustainable and rational critique of 
the new transnational corporate hegemony. 
Secondly, this paper underlines some of the 
characteristics of online networks as specific 
social structures. As has been demonstrated 
by Bennett and Segerberg (2011), connective 
networks tend to be particularly flexible and 
versatile, which can affect the sustainability of 
their ideology. In other words, beyond a lack of 
criticism, digital communication weakens the 
stability of political agendas in the long run.
We might postulate that issues of rational 
criticism and ideological sustainability are 
caused by that fact that the online public debate 
is not subjected to any form of regulation (Fra-
ser, 2005). By recalling the historical context 
in which Habermas (1962) sets the emergence 
of public opinion, this paper demonstrates that 
the bourgeois public sphere was initiated by 
intellectual elites, who exerted their intellectual 
leadership over public discourses. This process 
spontaneously regulated citizens’ deliberation 
and assured the rational criticism essential to 
the public sphere. Today, this theory appears 
to be particularly relevant and topical when it 
comes to interpreting the digital revolution as 
well as some of the recent political changes oc-
curring in the Middle East and for which social 
media played a significant role. The function of 
digital media in the 2011 Tunisian and Egyptian 
revolutions leads us to think that, ever since the 
eighteenth century, the liberalisation of infor-
mation has reached a critical point, and now 
affects the way the public debate operates. New 
forms of public mobilisations not only bring us 
to rethink the normative public sphere but also 
to understand how democratising countries of 
the digital era fit the Habermassian model of 
the eighteenth century. Like the emergence of 
the press and bourgeois literature on the eve of 
the French revolution, access to digital media in 
countries such as Tunisia and Egypt stimulate 
a democratic and deliberative culture. For this 
reason, it is worth examining the digital and 
transnational public sphere under the light of the 
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2011 Arab revolutions. In this regard, this article 
will address the Tunisian and Egyptian contexts 
with the purpose of analysing the correlation 
between digital innovations and the democratis-
ing process. More specifically, it illustrates the 
lack of ideological sustainability in the context 
of the Tunisian and Egyptian post-revolutions 
and describes how the digital divide can act as 
a natural regulator of the online public sphere.
CONNECTIVITY AND 
PARTICIPATORY CULTURE
Whereas Van Dijck (2013) essentially applies 
the concept of connectivity to social media, 
this term could also be used to designate a 
broader spectrum of online social practices in 
the context of web 2.0. For instance, Bennett 
and Segerberg (2011) refer to online activism 
as connective action. Besides this, one could 
argue that, in the context of technological 
convergence provided by the internet, the cul-
ture of connectivity characterises mainstream 
media as well as digital media. In this regard, 
Robertson (2013) claims that social media have 
a significant influence on the news coverage of 
mainstream media and television in particular. 
This indicates that the culture of connectivity 
is not specific to the internet and potentially 
qualifies the majority of the communication 
flows that contribute to shape public opinion 
in the digital era. In a broader spectrum, con-
nectivity can be interpreted as a paradigm 
characterising the sociological and political 
practices of the digital era. Accordingly, this 
new communicative pattern will potentially 
explain a large proportion of future offline 
and online social interactions. On the other 
hand, the terms collaborative and participa-
tory emphasize the interactive nature of digital 
devices, as opposed to traditional media. The 
concept of collaborative culture expresses the 
democratic values inherited from the pioneers 
of the internet. It underlines the accessibility and 
flexibility of online information as well as the 
bottom-up dynamics that typify online public 
discourses. This is precisely how we distinguish 
connective and collaborative culture as we go 
on to address the issues of rational criticism, 
ideological sustainability and intellectual lead-
ership in the digital era.
THE LIBERTARIAN UTOPIA 
OF A DIGITAL WORLD
Historically, the dream of a collaborative democ-
racy has been considerably influenced by the 
libertarian culture of the sixties which inspired 
many pioneers of the digital industry, such as 
Stewart Brand, Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs 
(Cardon, 2011; Flichy, 2011). As he traces the 
origins of the internet, Patrice Flichy (2006) 
recalls that the Arpanet project, which is well 
known as the first computer network and the pre-
decessor of the internet, was initially conceived 
collaboratively within a community of computer 
engineers. The collaborative dimension of to-
day’s connective culture manifested itself at a 
very early stage in the technical architecture of 
the internet. As they created more opportunities 
for cooperative projects, the pioneers of digital 
culture anticipated the use of the network and 
hoped to stimulate collective intelligence by 
extending the limits of human communication 
(Hiltz & Turoff, 1978). Before the application 
of digital technologies by the broad community 
of users, the ideals and values promoted by the 
initial designers of today’s connective envi-
ronment conveyed an utopia in which virtual 
societies were more democratic and enhanced 
interpersonal relationships (Flichy, 2006). In his 
book on Stewart Brand and digital utopianism, 
Fred Turner (2008) describes the community 
values behind the creation of the internet and 
acknowledges apparent similarities between the 
counterculture of the sixties and the emergent 
cyber-culture of the nineties. Yet paradoxically, 
according to Turner the designers of our new 
digital environment consisted in a small elite 
of highly educated computer scientists who 
appeared to be the only few individuals able 
to understand the shape of future communica-
tion networks.
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Among cyber-optimists (Oates, 2008), 
Douglas Rushkoff (2003) has argued that the 
interactivity and connectivity of the digital 
era revolutionises human thinking and socio-
political structures by establishing an open-
source democracy. According to Rushkoff, the 
collaborative culture of the digital era allows 
social reality to be perceived through multiple 
perspectives, which adds in complexity to 
human reflection. The digital revolution is 
comparable to the scientific discoveries of the 
Renaissance, as it institutes a multidimensional 
perception of the world and inspires new modes 
of representation. Similar to Henry Jenkins 
(2006) and his conception of the participatory 
culture, Rushkoff develops an optimistic vision 
of cyberspace. He defines virtual spaces as an 
alternative to neoliberal hegemony and claims 
that the online collaborative culture empow-
ers consumers and citizens with the ability to 
shape their political and cultural environment. 
This approach precisely reflects the ideals and 
values that motivated the digital revolution, 
according to which free access information 
and collective work break the dynamics of the 
neoliberal economy and renders users more 
critical. Yet paradoxically, some social scientists 
studying the evolution of cyberspace in the long 
run argue that the technolibertarianism (Bor-
sook, 2000) that inspired the digital revolution 
sustains neoliberalism and promotes a form of 
communicative capitalism (Dean, 2003). Due 
to corporate interests underlying the culture 
of connectivity, social scientists progressively 
question the ability of digital technologies to 
stimulate the rational deliberation essential to 
the public sphere.
In his essay The Internet Democracy, 
Promises and Limits, Dominique Cardon (2010) 
emphasises the contrast between the original 
purpose of the digital public space and its com-
mercial function. The agenda of the pioneers 
was to develop a critical discourse on society in 
which everyone would be able to participate, in 
part thanks to anonymity. Cardon argues that the 
libertarian utopia of the internet’s pioneers did 
not reach the broader community of users, who 
indirectly contributed to the success of search 
engines and content providers such as Google, 
YouTube and Facebook. Despite the promising 
development of collaborative work, open-
source licenses, and free access information, 
the mass of internet users failed to exploit the 
interactivity of cyberspace to create an alterna-
tive social reality and blindly reproduced their 
offline world online. Everyday life conversa-
tion progressively became an important part of 
online interactions between individuals, further 
affecting the original agenda. Overall, Cardon 
insists that the democratisation of public debate 
has merged public and private spheres together 
and reduced the quality of deliberations.
Likewise, Jodi Dean (2003) identifies ir-
reconcilable differences between the rational 
public sphere and today’s digital environment. 
This leads her to postulate that digital public 
spaces actually contribute to establish a com-
municative capitalism, which maintains people 
in the position of potential consumers. Demo-
cratic governance today is highly dependent 
on a consumption-driven entertainment culture 
(2003, p.102) and technoculture, according 
to which new communication technologies 
enhance participative democracy. From this 
perspective, she corroborates the arguments 
of Cardon (2010) and supposes a positive cor-
relation between the use of the internet and 
the expansion of global markets. According to 
Dean, the concept of publicity fails to activate 
substantial democratic deliberation and essen-
tially legitimates communicative capitalism, 
producing an illusion of the public sphere. In 
this regard, she recalls that (in accordance with 
Habermas’ theory) the public sphere acts as a 
“decentralized model of sovereignty”, emanat-
ing from the people, (2003, 104) that provides 
legitimacy to social institutions and authorities. 
Yet in the context of communicative capitalism 
the fact that the opinion of the people is indirectly 
driven by economic interests affects the role of 
the public sphere as a critical counter-power:
This is precisely my worry about the public 
sphere in communicative capitalism: the tech-
nologies, the concentrations of corporate power, 
the demands of financial markets, the seductions 
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of the society of the spectacle that rule in and 
as the name of the public have created condi-
tions anathema to democratic governance. The 
subjectless flows are sovereign – and that is the 
problem. (Dean, 2003)
Consequently, Dean describes the internet 
as a specific kind of social infrastructure - a 
zero institution - to which different members 
can belong while assuming their individual 
identities. Collectivities and individualities are 
constantly confronting each other on a global 
scale, which makes consensus very hard to 
reach. In providing the feeling of belonging to 
a global and virtual space for deliberation, the 
internet creates an illusion of freedom of speech 
and rational deliberation, which is sufficient 
to legitimate dominant ideologies. This leads 
to a neodemocracy in which the criteria of the 
normative public sphere are slightly transposed. 
In order to develop a critical and rational public 
sphere, opportunities for contestation should 
feed a sustainable critique of the dominant 
political climate and lead to a fully democratic 
consensus. However, in the case of neodemoc-
racies, the process of deliberation is limited to 
the stage of contestation. Consequently, even 
if information tends to be more transparent, 
this new form of publicity fails at stimulating 
an impartial political debate and maintains the 
hegemony of global corporations. Unlike the 
normative public sphere, the publicity of neode-
mocracies is used to enhance the credibility of 
corporate powers and justify decisive action.
From different perspectives, Cardon (2010) 
and Dean (2003) both accentuate the fact that 
today’s digital era fails to improve citizens’ 
criticism. Contrary to what suggests the digital 
utopia, connective culture serves corporate 
powers by maintaining users in the position 
of consumers, while creating an illusion of 
self-expression. Such interpretations have 
been supported by the latest studies on social 
media (Van Dijck, 2013). According to these 
sources, one could assume that the quality of 
public opinion would not be decreasing, if the 
original utopia of the collaborative cyberculture 
had not been affected by corporate interests.
From Habermassian 
Model to the Connective 
Deliberative Framework
As we can see, recent critiques of the con-
nective culture condemns the fact that digital 
media promote today’s neoliberal hegemony, 
and by doing so, fail at stimulating a critical 
public opinion among the communities of social 
media users. However, from a Habermassian 
perspective, one can argue that liberalising 
information actually trains citizens’ capacity to 
express subjective views in a critical way. More 
specifically, in the first stage of a democracy, 
liberalising public affairs meets the interest 
of the bourgeoisie willing to gain political 
power and privatise markets. In The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas 
identifies this phenomenon by first describing 
the simultaneous evolution of private markets 
and private information networks in the early 
eighteenth century:
Almost simultaneously with the origin of 
stock markets, postal services and the press 
institutionalized regular contacts and regular 
communication. […] These elements of early 
capitalist commercial relations, that is, the traf-
fic in commodities and news, manifested their 
revolutionary power only in the mercantilist 
phase in which, simultaneously with the modern 
state, the national and territorial economies 
assumed their shapes. (Habermas, 1962)
In a second stage, the fact that liberalis-
ing public debate meets the interests of a 
growing middle class assures the critical and 
democratising function of the public sphere. 
Indeed, according to Habermas, this educated 
social class has the intellectual resources to 
lead a rational discussion on public matters. 
Indirectly, economic motivations stimulated 
the democratic values of the Enlightenment and 
potentially preserve the quality and efficiency 
of the public sphere:
As soon as privatized individuals in their ca-
pacity as human beings ceased to communicate 
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merely about their subjectivity but rather in 
their capacity as property-owners desired to 
influence public power in their common inter-
est, the humanity of the literary public sphere 
served to increase the effectiveness of the public 
sphere in the political realm. [...] the interest of 
the owners of private property could converge 
with the interest of the freedom of the individual 
in general. (Habermas, 1962)
Additionally, one could argue that the 
emancipation of individuals’ and citizens’ sub-
jectivity that occurred within bourgeois societies 
prefigured the social function that consumers 
were about to play in today’s capitalist and 
neoliberal economy. The role of economic and 
corporate interests in the process of develop-
ing a critical public sphere has been stated in 
the initial theory of the public sphere, which 
indicates that commercialising social interac-
tions through digital media is not affecting the 
quality of public debates in itself. It is possible, 
however, that the exploitation of connective 
networks for economic purpose has reached a 
critical point, after which it can no more improve 
the quality of public opinion. Nevertheless, if 
the efficiency of the normative public sphere 
does not interfere with citizens’ criticism, other 
criteria should be identified to anticipate the 
distinctions between traditional forms of public 
deliberations and new connective structures. 
Examining the latest critiques of our connective 
environment in the light of the Habermassian 
bourgeois public sphere leads to identify two 
main criteria. The first criterion lies in citizens’ 
ability to share their views and argue rationally. 
Further to the fact that connectivity does not 
always reach its initial objective; to develop an 
alternative to the neoliberal hegemony, social 
scientists detected a lack of rational argument 
in digital interactions.
POPULARITY OF THE ONLINE 
DEBATES: A THREAT TO 
RATIONAL CRITICISM
Patrice Flichy (2010) describes the digital era 
as the recognition of amateurs as legitimate 
contributors to public knowledge. According 
to Flichy, the most significant sociological 
change generated by internet and social media 
lies in the fact that amateurs gained credibility 
in their fields of interest. Whereas experts and 
professionals were traditionally considered the 
only reliable reference on any questions relating 
to sciences, art, culture and politics; connective 
media provided random amateurs with the op-
portunity to contribute to public knowledge. In 
the context of politics, this phenomenon affects 
the way the normative public sphere operates, 
given that internet users who shape public 
discourses are not subject to the traditional 
gatekeepers (Mc Combs, 2004; Cottle 2004). 
As opposed to Habermas’ model, today’s public 
opinion is not moderated by the members of 
any specific intellectual society. Amateurs can 
potentially become leaders of the connective 
public sphere. Yet, according to Flichy, these 
new public figures provide unreliable arguments 
and fail in discussing public matters in a critical 
and rational way. Additionally, Flichy (2010) 
observes that the recognition of amateurs in 
the public sphere intensifies the diffusion of 
political views. Due to the fact that connective 
media target very specific audiences, opinions 
are expressed in a very scattered way and citi-
zens tend to interact exclusively with people 
that share a similar interpretation of the facts. 
Consequently, different ideologies are hardly 
confronted with each other on the same website 
and members of the connective public space 
have only very few opportunities to assess, 
question and improve their arguments. Once 
again, this phenomenon significantly alters 
the quality and efficiency of the public sphere 
(Flichy, 2010).
Flichy concludes that online political en-
gagement tends to be less sustainable and does 
not encourage debate between communities 
of citizens with opposing ideological views. 
He argues that the digital era has transformed 
the traditional forms of political networks that 
were active in the second part of the twentieth 
century. Whereas citizens previously engaged 
themselves in the long run to promote a party 
or an ideology, the amateurs of the digital era 
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operate from time to time to support specific 
political projects in order to preserve their 
individual interests.
Again, this interpretation ascertains the 
paradox that lies between the original digital 
utopia and the growing connective culture, as 
it claims that bottom-up communication flows 
alters the quality of public opinion. Unlike the 
libertarian values of the technoculture, it sug-
gests that, connective forms of public expression 
should be filtered and regulated, as it is the case 
for the press and mainstream media. In order 
to preserve rational thinking, the public sphere 
should be structured by a formal hierarchy and 
moderated by professionals and experts: “This 
online deliberative democracy works provided 
that formalised rules are respected, accepted by 
the participants and reminded by moderators.” 
(Flichy, 2010)
Like Flichy, Nancy Fraser (2005) empha-
sises the need for regulating connective com-
munications as she postulates the existence of 
a transnational public sphere. By referring to 
Habermas’ model of the public sphere, Fraser 
recalls that a critical public opinion inevitably 
emerges within the context of a national sover-
eign power, in order to maintain the democratic 
balance between State authority and citizen 
empowerment. However, the global com-
municative infrastructure fails to facilitate an 
efficient public debate in which national policies 
are distinctively discussed and negotiated. This 
implies that transnational citizenship should 
foremost be recognized and institutionalised as 
part of a transnational democratic infrastructure. 
In other words, Fraser demonstrates that in 
order to comply with the Habermassian public 
sphere, transnational regulations should be ap-
plied to connective interactions. Additionally, 
Flichy suggests that moderating these emerging 
practices could also improve the quality of the 
public sphere, not only regarding the rational-
ity of public deliberation but also by ensuring 
ideological sustainability.
Ideological Sustainability
Among the weaknesses of online discourses, 
Flichy states that digital communication devices 
render individuals’ political engagement more 
superficial. Flichy explains this phenomenon 
on the grounds that the boundary between 
private and public spaces is hard to define. In 
a collaborative context, personal experiences 
shared by private internet users are progressively 
collected and interpreted by broader networks 
to promote a particular political message. In-
dividuals partially contribute to larger social 
movements, without being involved in the 
entire political process or understanding their 
strategic and ideological purpose. Furthermore, 
in today’s connective environment, political 
organisations appear to be less exclusive and 
citizens are likely to be affiliated with different 
parties depending on their personal interests. 
This reveals another condition of the public 
sphere that digital media have not yet fulfilled.
This condition resides in the ideological 
sustainability of the views and opinions ex-
pressed by internet and social media users. In-
deed, the flexibility of public opinion in a digital 
context renders the range of political positions 
harder to visualise. This is precisely what has 
been illustrated by some of the latest research on 
cyber-activism (Bennett and Segerberg, 2011), 
according to which new forms of political action 
are likely to be less sustainable in the long run 
and harder to represent in the context of repre-
sentative democracy. Setting out an inventory of 
the strategies employed by activists’ networks, 
Bennett and Segerberg (2011) claim that new 
manifestations of political engagement emerg-
ing in cyberspace should now be assessed in 
terms of their ideological sustainability. Their 
study demonstrates the particular flexibility of 
connective networks as well as noting that, as 
opposed to traditional forms of collective action, 
online activism enables members involved in a 
common cause to express their individualities 
within the group. Given that individuals can 
personalize the object of common interest, the 
action becomes more fluid and is more likely 
to appeal to members from different social and 
cultural backgrounds. However, this indicates 
that the outcome of connective action is less 
predictable and that its ideological message 
is not sustainable. Similarly, in the context of 
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global security, Hoskins and O’ Loughlin (2010) 
demonstrate that the coverage of war by digital 
media renders the causality of events harder 
to interpret. New mass media provide publics 
with the opportunity to record and compile 
every single event. By doing so, digital media 
generate diffuse interpretations of the facts and 
prove to have a significant influence in foreign 
policy. As the narratives of war progressively 
become more diffuse, the outcome is less pre-
dictable, which makes the conduct of war by 
policymakers highly difficult. Like Bennett and 
Segerberg, Hoskins and O’ Loughlin suggest 
that the fluidity of online social interactions is 
hardly compatible with the traditional struc-
ture of representative governments. Bennett 
and Segerberg therefore propose to normalise 
connective action, from the perspective of its 
potential ideological sustainability. Indeed, they 
claim that the structural flexibility of connec-
tive networks requires assessing their ability 
to stand for specific ideological views as well 
as their political efficiency in the long run and 
in accordance with the criteria of the emerging 
connective culture:
It is from the perspective particular to connec-
tive action that it becomes fruitful to return 
to [...] the general debate about digitally 
networked dissent: the question whether such 
action can be politically effective and sustained. 
[...] These concerns need to be addressed even 
if the contours of political action may be shift-
ing: sustainability and effect are fundamental 
to assessing any collective action in the context 
of popular democracy. Given the nature of con-
nective action, then, it is imperative to develop 
a means of thinking meaningfully about the 
capacities of sustainability and effectiveness 
in specifically networked action [...]. (Bennett 
& Segerberg, 2011)
In other words, if the incapacity of virtual 
public spaces to produce efficient deliberation 
is due to a lack of rational criticism or ideo-
logical sustainability, the answer is to apply 
the proper rules and regulations on the proper 
scale. Again, however, assessing and regulating 
digital practices contradicts the original agenda 
of collaborative culture by institutionalising 
online interactions. Consequently, we need to 
identify the natural processes through which 
online debate can be filtered and improved in 




SUSTAINABILITY: THE CASE 
OF THE ARAB SPRING
The Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions perfectly 
illustrate the issue of ideological sustainability. 
One of the characteristics of the 2011 Arab 
uprisings lies in the fact that social media and 
connective action enabled protestors to gather 
from very different sociological backgrounds 
and political views. According to Bennett and 
Segerberg (2011) it is precisely the flexibility 
that provided the leaders of the revolutions to 
reach such a diversified audience. Yet beyond 
people’s will to remove Moubarak’s and Ben 
Ali’s governments, post-revolutionary events 
demonstrated that the revolution was not mo-
tivated by any homogenous political ideology. 
On the contrary, it is probable that the strategic 
application of social media by revolutionar-
ies created an illusion of consensus, whereas 
Tunisian and Egyptian protests were driven 
by different and conflicting political agendas.
In post-revolutionary Tunisia, 144 new 
parties reflecting different political orienta-
tions applied to the Ministry of the Interior 
before the election of the new Constituent 
Assembly, which indicates a considerable 
diversity of ideological opinions among the 
population. Uppermost, the outcome of this 
election revealed a strong ideological contrast 
between the young leaders of the revolution and 
the conservative party Ennahda that won the 
majority of the Constituent Assembly. Indeed, 
young Tunisian cyber-activists like Lina Ben 
Mhenni (2011), who initiated the uprisings in 
favour of a liberal and modernist democracy, 
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expressed their regret regarding the result of 
the first democratic elections.
In Egypt, conflicts of interest between the 
different political actors have been even more 
significant, given the strong implication of the 
army in the national economy (Paciello, 2011). 
The demission of former president Moubarak 
encouraged the people to claim more and to ex-
press specific ideological views. The revolution 
only introduced a series of public demonstra-
tions illustrating the opposition between military 
and civilian interests. Moreover, as in Tunisia, 
deeper ideological oppositions exist between 
some of the movements that contributed to 
the success of the revolution (Masoud, 2011). 
For instance, the demands of young activists 
inspired by leading Egyptian liberals such 
as Mohamed El Baradei or Naguib Sawiris 
contrast with the agenda of the traditionalist 
parties like the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Salafi movement that succeeded in the 2011-
2012 parliamentary elections:
The pluralism (and attendant lack of leadership) 
of Egypt’s revolt has been hailed as its great 
strength, but today it appears to be the pri-
mary obstacle to translating the revolt against 
Mubarak into a genuine democratic revolution. 
[…] The country’s revolutionaries - liberal and 
Islamist - will have to find some way of manag-
ing their differences if they are to have a hope 
of bequeathing the legitimate government that 
Egyptians deserve. (Masoud, 2011)
From the perspective of a connective cul-
ture, this demonstrates that collective forms of 
actions taking shape on social media uphold 
superficial social identities that do not annihilate 
deeper socio-economic or political divisions. 
This is precisely what we regard here as an 
issue of ideological sustainability. The case of 
the 2011 Arab revolutions also shows that this 
phenomenon not only characterises online social 
interactions as opposed to offline sociological 
and political practices. Indeed, cyber-activism 
is only one of the parameters that contributed to 
the success of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolu-
tions. Yet the lack of ideological sustainability 
is likely to typify the era of connectivity, as a 
new cultural paradigm. Given that the digital 
revolution indirectly generates new commu-
nication patterns, one can suppose that such a 
distinctive feature might explain some of the 
fundamental sociological and political changes 
of the twenty-first century.
EXAMPLE OF REGULATION 
IN A CONNECTIVE 
ENVIRONMENT: 
INTELLECTUAL LEADERSHIP 
AND THE DIGITAL DIVIDE
At this stage, it is worth recalling that Haber-
mas’ model of the bourgeois public sphere, in 
the democratising Europe of the eighteenth 
century, relies on the intellectual leadership of 
an educated elite. As demonstrated by Nancy 
Fraser in her critique of the liberal public sphere 
(1991), Habermas conceptualises the emergence 
of a deliberative culture as an elitist process 
through which bourgeois intellectual leaders 
held the privilege of expressing their views 
publically. The nascent public discourses of 
salons and coffee houses as well as the argu-
ments emanating from the press and literature 
were exclusively provided by a minority of 
people able to argue their opinions rationally 
and experiment with democratic deliberation. 
Habermas specifies that the bourgeois public 
sphere did not initially involve people deprived 
of the intellectual resources needed to deliberate:
In relation to the mass of the rural population 
and the common “people” in the towns, of 
course, the public “at large” that was being 
formed diffusely outside the early institutions of 
the public was still extremely small. Elementary 
education, where it existed, was inferior. The 
proportion of illiterates, at least in Great Britain, 
even exceeded that of the preceding Elizabethan 
epoch. […] The masses were not only largely 
illiterate but also so pauperized that they could 
not even pay for literature. […] Nevertheless, 
with the emergence of the diffuse public formed 
in the course of the commercialization of cul-
tural production, a new social category arose. 
(Habermas, 1962)
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By underlining the fact that the bourgeoisie 
of the eighteenth century had exclusive access 
to the public scene as well as to the intellectual 
resources required to contribute to critical de-
liberation, Habermas leads us to reconsider the 
phenomenon of the digital divide from another 
angle. Indeed, with regard to development 
studies, which investigate the perspectives for 
electronic governance and e-deliberation in de-
veloping countries, the digital divide has always 
been seen as an obstacle to the implementation 
of e-democracy (Chatfiel & Alhujran, 2009). 
However, by observing the achievements of 
the online public sphere in Tunisia and Egypt 
during the Arab spring, one could argue that the 
intellectual leadership inherent to the bourgeois 
public sphere is still prominent in countries that 
show a high level of digital divide.
By conducting a survey among Tunisian 
internet users, Anita Breuer (2012) demonstrates 
that the 2011 protests were covered and organ-
ised by a young educated elite who managed 
to draw the attention of the international com-
munity, despite the media blackout imposed by 
Ben Ali’s administration. Like the emancipation 
of a critical public in the original theory of the 
public sphere, digital technologies and social 
media contributed to the “politicization and mo-
bilization of the young urban middle class and 
elites” (Breuer 2012). This digital infrastructure 
that enabled strategic communications between 
the minority of young educated activists, the 
rural poor and the diasporas played a significant 
role in the success of the Tunisian revolution:
A surprising element of the Tunisian uprising 
was its broad, cross-class support. As has been 
demonstrated, the Internet and social media 
significantly contributed to transcend geo-
graphical and socio-economic boundaries and 
facilitated collaboration among the alienated 
intellectual elite, the rural poor, and the urban 
middle class. It thus helped to remove one of 
the central obstacles of collective action under 
authoritarianism, namely the lack of social 
interaction. (Breuer 2012, p.25)
While research like that of Dean and 
others cited above has revealed seemingly ir-
reconcilable differences between public sphere 
and connective culture in Western established 
democracies, Breuer (2012) and Iskander 
(2011) show that, in Tunisia and Egypt, digital 
devices stimulated the politicisation of younger 
generations. According to the UN database, the 
amount of internet users in 2010 reached 36.8% 
of the population in Tunisia and 26.7% in Egypt. 
Comparatively, the same year, internet users 
represented 74% of the population in USA and 
85% in United Kingdom. This confirms Breuer’s 
argument and suggests that only a minority of 
the local population actively used social media 
to lead protests and raise the attention of the 
international community. Furthermore, the Arab 
Social Media Report published by Dubai School 
of Governance (Mourtada & Salem, 2011) indi-
cates that the average for Facebook’s penetration 
in the Arab region at the end of 2010 was only 
6.77%. Given the disproportion of internet and 
social media users between Western societies 
and Arab democratising countries, one can eas-
ily argue that the community of internet users 
involved in the 2011 Arab uprisings reflected the 
bourgeois public sphere. Indeed, this minority 
formed a homogenous sociological category 
of people who benefitted from the economic 
resources as well as from the education needed 
to access and produce online information. 
This intellectual elite succeeded in leading a 
critical counter-power as well as an efficient 
political action. This prompts the thought that 
the internet may be more likely to generate 
democratic culture and critical deliberation in 
countries where educated middle classes have 
easier access to digital technologies. As with 
the issue of literacy and the lack of intellectual 
resources among the broader population in the 
eighteenth century, the digital divide acts as a 
natural filter or gatekeeper of the public sphere. 
It guarantees that the very few users participat-
ing in online deliberation have the intellectual 
capital to invest in the broader audience and 
potentially recognise themselves as intellectual 
leaders. In this sense, digital divide functions as a 
natural regulator of the online public sphere and 
Copyright © 2014, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.
88   International Journal of E-Politics, 5(1), 78-90, January-March 2014
answers the need highlighted by Flichy (2010) 
and Fraser (2005) to moderate cyberspace.
This observation helps to conceptualise 
participative democracy on two different 
levels. First of all, it partly explains why the 
online public debate reached a consensus and 
proved to be politically efficient in the case of 
Tunisia and Egypt, whereas social scientists 
are still questioning the political outcome of 
a participatory culture in digitally developed 
countries. Secondly, if the hypothetical correla-
tion between digital divide and intellectual lead-
ership were to be confirmed after being tested 
empirically, this would annul the advantages 
of participative democracy over representative 
democracy. Indeed, the natural regulation by 
an intellectual leadership of the digital public 
space remains a top-down structure and fails in 
promoting the libertarian values of connective 
culture. Besides these questions, the digital 
divide is not a solution in itself, as it prevents 
illiterate and digitally deprived people from 
experiencing deliberation. Nevertheless, as 
the intellectual leadership of the bourgeoisie 
played a significant role in promoting delib-
erative culture in established democracies, this 
phenomenon may still influence connective 
practices in democratising countries.
CONCLUSION
The dream of a fully transparent public space 
with no internal or external hierarchy empower-
ing citizens with more freedom of speech has 
been achieved. However, this does not entirely 
meet the original agenda of the digital culture, 
according to which users develop alternative 
ways of thinking and consolidate a critical 
counter-power able to contest global corporate 
hegemonies. In fact, the libertarian utopia that 
inspired the designers of this growing digital 
culture contrasts with the reality of cyberspace. 
This is not only due to the fact that digital 
communications contribute to the success of 
transnational corporate powers, but also to the 
fact that an entirely free and accessible public 
deliberation with no regulation might not be 
efficient in terms of rationality. Furthermore, 
this type of public debate fails in questioning the 
dominant political environment and elaborating 
a sustainable opposition with a clear ideologi-
cal identity. These issues of rational criticism 
and ideological sustainability constitute fun-
damental differences between the normative 
public sphere and the emerging network of 
new transnational public spaces. Identifying 
these parameters helps conceptualising future 
e-democracies, as it clarifies the reasons why 
deliberation emanating from a digital environ-
ment is often hard to actualise efficiently in the 
context of a representative democracy. In fact, 
it is worth remembering that the model of the 
bourgeois public sphere is naturally regulated 
by the intellectual leadership of the bourgeoi-
sie, which suggests that hierarchical structures 
might be beneficial to democracy.
In the case of participative cyberspace, 
one can argue that the digital divide is an 
equivalent to the intellectual leadership of 
the bourgeoisie and acts as a natural regulator 
of the online public sphere. This hypothesis 
seems particularly relevant in the case of the 
Tunisian or Egyptian 2011 revolutions in 
which the educated middle class developed a 
strategic use of social media to communicate 
on behalf of poor and rural populations. One 
can argue that the digital divide – just like the 
intellectual leadership of the normative public 
sphere – rendered public opinion politically 
efficient by leading citizens to a consensus in 
the first stage of the 2011 uprisings. However, 
the political instability and ideological divisions 
following the revolutions perfectly illustrate the 
issue of ideological sustainability. Therefore, 
the case of the Arab Spring does not ascertain 
that intellectual leadership or even less digital 
divide increases rational criticism or ideological 
sustainability. However, it is worth noticing that 
the intellectual leadership of educated elites, 
which can partly be explained by the digital 
divide, functions as a natural regulator of online 
public discourses. As such, it is likely to improve 
the political efficiency of public deliberation.
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